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The Layalina Review

VOL. V NO. 5, February 13-February 26, 2009

A Last Hurrah for Al-Hurra?

Academics and experts in media and public diplomacy have widely reached a consensus on the fact that public diplomacy has not achieved its full potential, comments William Rugh for Arab Media & Society. Rugh asserts that the worldwide proliferation of satellite television over the past decade provided an opportunity that the Bush administration missed, at least at first.

When the BBG established the Arabic language television channel Al-Hurra in February 2004, the agency argued that it would provide accurate information and truthful commentary in an environment that they claimed was both hostile to the US and insufficiently "free." But this project, "turned out to be a disappointment because of its poor programming and poll data showing that it failed to attract a significant audience," deplores Rugh.

The channel's reluctance to tackle controversial issues, unlike Al-Jazeera, coupled with the findings by the University of Southern California in 2008 that "Al-Hurra's journalism was weak, lacked relevance to the audience, and was perceived to be biased propaganda," was further detrimental to US public diplomacy.

Rugh argues that the problem lies in the BBG itself. "The BBG was created to be independent but it has become a small fiefdom beholden to a few narrow interests and in practice unaccountable because few outside the Board have paid attention to it," he comments.

Rugh recommends that "the BBG system should be reformed, at least with a clear mandate and the addition of independent review boards." The mandate should be clarified along the lines of the VOA charter.

He suggests that high quality talent should be hired to manage programs in a balanced way following the charter. Independent review committees composed of bilingual professional journalists who are familiar with both America and the Arab world should monitor output periodically against the revised mandate, and transcripts should be made freely available.

Hussain Abdul Hussain for Oped News concurs that the problem lies in management. "America micromanaging Al-Hurra over staff nationality quotas and programming is certainly no solution," he says. To reverse failure, Al-Hurra needs competent leadership and staff, he continues.

Even after various reshuffles, the majority of Al-Hurra staffers still do not speak English despite being required to communicate America's perspective from Washington, DC. Hussain claims that Al-Hurra lost its raison d'etre, while its leadership stood defiant against calls for reform.

Robert Satloff, a think tank expert and now host of Al-Hurra's Inside Washington, told a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report in February 2005, "As an alternative to Al-Hurra, it would be much cheaper to offer tax incentives to US broadcasters to perform the service of dubbing and then duplicating their news in Arabic."

He added, "The fact that CNN and Fox News are nongovernmental enterprises ensures far greater credibility than what is proposed for [Al-Hurra]."

Mark Lynch argues for The National that the half a billion dollars spent on Arabic-language broadcasting, including the launch of Radio Sawa and the television station Al-Hurra, has overshadowed traditional public diplomacy work, such as exchange and cultural programs.

Washington debates competing reports of its slim market share, but the broader truth is that Al-Hurra has had little discernible impact on Arab political discourse. When President Obama sought to reach Arab audiences, he – like the Bush officials before him – wisely turned to Al-Arabiya.

"There is an emerging consensus about the urgent importance of such a new public diplomacy for Obama's foreign policy objectives. Arabs and Muslims should recognize their own stake in the realization of this new vision for global engagement and a public diplomacy based on genuine dialogue - and give the new outreach a chance." Back to articles.