US reliance on Jordanian intelligence, a decades-old partnership forged in part by both countries' aversion to Islamic radicalism has proved useful in the past. However, it is now being questioned after an obvious failure to communicate that led to a Jordanian "triple agent" who blew himself up at a CIA outpost in Afghanistan last week, reports The National. The news site remarks that this is a sign of clouded relations that have now become obvious.

This revelation may prove uncomfortable for the Hashemite Kingdom as it is currently facing a foundering economy and pressure for delaying domestic political reforms.

"The overwhelming majority of Jordanian public opinion, and indeed Arab public opinion, disagrees with US policy in the region, and the revelation of this incident highlights the strong co-ordination between the government of Jordan and the US, particularly with CIA operatives in Afghanistan," explains Fares Braizat, a Jordan expert and head of research at Qatar University's Social and Economic Survey Research Institute.

Homam Khaleel Mohammad Abu Mallal was reportedly recruited by Jordanian intelligence to infiltrate Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and acquire information vital to America's war effort there. Instead, the 33-year-old Jordanian physician turned on them, detonating a bomb at the behest of Al-Qaeda that killed seven CIA officers and his Jordanian handler, according to the news site.

Although believed to be operating there, Jordan has never officially confirmed its presence in Afghanistan.

Ellen Laipson, president of the Stimson Center, a Washington-based think tank, speculates that the revelation that the Jordanian General Intelligence Department (GID) was operating beside American forces in Afghanistan "has probably created some friction or discomfort in Jordan." An issue that King Abdullah of Jordan will have to deal with now.

Even though Jordan has always been an ally of the US in combating terrorism, the disclosure has also led to criticism of the Jordanian government for taking part in far-flung conflicts, said Mohammed Al-Masri, head of public opinion polling at the University of Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies.

"Many in the elite are asking, 'Are they really furthering Jordanian security, or just providing services for America'?" he remarks. The National adds that paramount among the public is concern that political reform at home has been sacrificed for the pay-off of unbending support for America.

Mustafa Hamarneh a political analyst who now runs a community center in a village just outside Amman, points out, "What we hear from people in Washington and from Americans visiting the region is, 'Don't expect pressure from Washington.'"

In the meantime, international human rights organizations have expressed concern about rampant abuses, including arbitrary detentions, torture in prison and, more recently, deaths from alleged police beatings in Jordan.

Some fear this pressure, combined with Jordan's enfeebled moderate Islamist opposition, could further choke off venues for peaceful discourse and, in turn, possibly lend itself to more radical actions.

Reuel Marc Gerecht, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, comments for The Wall Street Journal that if anything, this also demonstrates that jihadists are now displaying an impressive counterintelligence ability, underestimated by the CIA. He remarks that Hashemite monarchy imprisons lots of Islamic militants, and the GID has the responsibility to interrogate them.

The dead Jordanian official, Sharif Ali bin Zeid, reportedly a member of the royal family, may not have been a down-and-dirty case officer with considerable hands-on contact with militants, but Al-Balawi surely passed through some kind of intensive screening process with the GID.

"Yet the GID and the CIA got played, and Al-Qaeda has revealed that it is capable of running sophisticated clandestine operations with sustained deception," notes Gerecht. He concludes that the Fort Hood incident, the failed Christmas terrorist attempt and the double-agent suicide bombing in Khost "ought to tell us that America's war with Islamic militancy is far—far—from being over."

According to Doyle MacMannus for the LA Times, these past jihadist incidents rather illustrate a failure to communicate among the various intelligence agencies. He argues, "It probably won't be clear for a while exactly what lapses in the system allowed Abdulmutallab to board a Detroit-bound plane wearing underwear packed with explosives -- whether the fault lies with the CIA, the separate National Counterterrorism Center or some combination of agencies."

The problem resides in what he coins the "institutional culture." The CIA exists mainly to collect secret information; the FBI, to catch and prosecute criminals; the State Department, to promote US interests overseas. "Their missions are different, so their cultures are different; some friction is unavoidable."

MacMannus concludes that by shining light on organizational dysfunction that is hard to dramatize, the attempted bombing has highlighted a problem that desperately needs to be solved. "It might even generate the political will to come up with a fix -- and, this time, to make it stick."