Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy James K. Glassman has reiterated his view that public diplomacy “is not about us, and in order to win the war of ideas the US just needs to undermine the message of extremists” in an article for Foreign Policy. Referring to the conversation between Under Secretary of State Judith McHale and Pakistani journalist Ansar Abbasi, Glassman points out that the latter is known for “his xenophobia, his support for conspiracy theories, and his knee-jerk anti-Americanism.”

In an interview during McHale’s recent trip to Pakistan, Abbasi scolded her "polite presentation about building bridges between America and the Muslim world." Glassman argues that reasoning with people like Abbasi is futile and any attempt at reconciliation is bound to be fruitless.

“Making people like us better is a perfectly decent US goal, but is an image-building strategy the most effective use of public diplomacy's tools in such a crucial relationship? And should the US public image even be such a priority in the first place?” he asks.

However, Glassman also remarks that US public diplomacy should not focus on getting people to like the US, and instead should thrive to undercut violent extremists by helping Pakistanis in their own government and civil society engage their fellow citizens with a more powerful narrative. “The United States need not be Miss Congeniality to win the war of ideas. We just need to make moderates hate extremists more than they dislike us.”

Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are increasingly viewed unfavorably in Pakistan, and although some US measures have contributed to this trend, it is mainly the ruthlessness of extremist acts that shifted public opinion. Glassman nonetheless claims that the US should attempt to improve its image with Pakistanis, although this requires a more realistic approach.

He further comments that while $600 million of the budget for public diplomacy is currently spent on educational and exchange programs, “public diplomacy, as conducted during the Cold War, must be more immediate, countering pernicious ideologies and helping divert young people from following a path that leads to terrorism.”

The best way to achieve results is by supporting people who share US interests and by providing them with the means to accomplish their goals, Glassman says. He indicates that mutual interests can be achieved, defeating the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, without America being more popular than it already is.

The “accurate” narrative, which strategic communications should promote, is that Muslim societies are currently in the midst of profound change and upheaval. “In general, they are coping with the upheaval well and in the end they will succeed, but the struggle is extremely difficult,” Glassman concludes.

Rami G. Khouri, staff writer for the Daily Star, concurs that Americans should listen carefully to Muslims and set aside the anger that has “blinded” Americans in the wake of 9/11.

Khouri points out that an exaggerated focus on “Islam” and “Muslim extremists” has defined intellectual analysis and foreign policy alike. He stresses that Islamic religion and culture should be emphasized over the policies practiced by all parties involved; Arab and Islamic states as well as the US, Europe and Israel.

Khouri also remarks that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have not reduced the threats posed by terrorism. If anything, he continues, “public diplomacy campaigns that have mainly succeeded in revealing Americans’ most erratic foreign policy eccentricities, intellectual weaknesses, and ideological vulnerabilities.”

The recent creation of a new post in the US Department of State, the “office of the special representative to Muslim communities” illustrates the “peculiarly American vortex where ignorance converges with pedantic arrogance and the crass distortions of special interest lobby groups,” he says.

Farah Pandith, the first person to fill this position, recently addressed the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), to discuss her new role and the US approach to Muslim engagement. However, Khouri denounces the fact that WINEP is widely known to be a mainstay of pro-Israeli thinking, and a pillar of what many people refer to as “the pro-Israel lobby.”

Khouri argues that this approach to public diplomacy further exposes the confusion between religion, nationalism and foreign policy. Many Muslims continue to feel that US foreign policy is tilted toward pro-Israeli interests or the incumbency of Arab autocrats, as has been the case for nearly four decades.

Khouri laments that very few in US public diplomacy circles seem to have grasped this notion.